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Information  is  an  asset;  if  one  is  informed,  one  can  make  the  right  choices,  act
appropriately,  reason  with  insight.  From  an  individual  and  collective  perspective,  the
acquisition  of  information  is  a  way  to  gain  authority.  For  the  Enlightenment
encyclopédistes,  availability and circulation of information was a vital  instrument in the
quest for a better and less unjust society. In societies based on property and competition,
however, information, like any other asset, is also a value that can be accumulated and
contribute to the creation of additional value. Know-how is a competitive advantage, and
information therefore also takes the guise of a commodity that has both an owner and a
price. In other words, information is an asset (yet another asset) to which modern societies
have an ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, it is an asset that holds universal value,
and on the other, it is subject to a social distribution which has a market for commodities
‘and other services’ as its condition.
In her recent book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at
the New Frontier of Power, Shoshana Zuboff uses the concept of ‘surveillance capitalism’
to  characterize  the  way  information  today  has  become  a  new  source  of  value
accumulation. Companies that have become world-dominant over the past twenty years by
basing their activity on electronic platforms — the French call them GAFA: companies like
Google,  Amazon,  Facebook,  Apple  —  have  made  money,  not  only  by  selling  their
particular services to the users of their platforms, but also by utilizing the traces left by
users on these platform to create a new market for processing and reselling knowledge
about very large groups of users (or citizens, the two terms themselves have become
interestingly difficult to clearly distinguish from each other) that can be put to work in a
wide range of fields, commercially as well as politically.
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Zuboff discusses the social and political implications of this new paradigm for harvesting
and processing information, and her book comes at a time when the general public — as
always a bit late — has become aware of the enormous resources available to this new
economy, and the scale of  its consequences,  not  only  in terms of what  we are being
recommended to buy on the Internet, but also in terms of the significance of Cambridge
Analytica for the US presidential election, or of EU's large-scale policy initiatives for the
protection of personal data. 
Now, this discussion also begs the question whether surveillance capitalism's new way of
handling  and  exploiting  information  is  not  also  about  to  change  the  way  we  should
understand what ‘information’ really is. The discipline of information studies has mostly, in
different guises, considered a unit of information in quite formal terms, as a reference that
denotes something specific, or a predication of a state of things, ‘a difference that makes a
difference’, as the semiologists have it. A designation that pronounces something useful
about something. This minimal and efficient definition has, then, formed the basis for a
comprehensive exploration of how information circulates, a research tradition that, despite
an increasingly refined conceptual apparatus and many different contexts of use, is still
indebted to Roman Jakobson's old communication model. This model starts out from an
essential  information  unit,  the  ‘message’,  and  then  contextualizes  this  message  by
attributing it  to  a  sender and identifying a recipient,  and,  furthermore,  by mapping the
communication channel it passes through and the coding it has undergone.
Recent  media  historical  research,  on  the  other  hand,  has  questioned  this  prevalent
‘information positivism’ that assumes the straightforward existence of information and then
precipitates  to  the  subsequent  examination  of  how and to  what  effect  it  circulates.  In
contrast,  media  historians  have  insisted  that  what  is  perceived  as  and  functions  as
information in a given historical context, depends on and cannot be separated from the
actual  societal  mode of existence of salient  information units.  A publicist  and a patent
attorney will not only often appear to have conflicting interests, but probably also to define
information differently,  derived from the specific contexts that the provision and use of
information entails for the two. In the following, I wish to examine the particular form that
comes to characterise ‘information’ in the age of surveillance capitalism, and how it differs
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from earlier forms, including the common-sensical form of a reference to (and possibly the
predication of) something which is the case.
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, an ‘information society’ is characterized
by three features: firstly, the ubiquity of new media in contemporary societies, secondly,
the increasing media literacy and media usage, and thirdly, the alignment and integration
of computer technologies into still  more areas of social  life. Or, in other words, and in
reverse  order:  that  information  is  processed  by  machines,  that  more  people  use  and
generate machine-compatible information, and that this use becomes ubiquitous. Or in still
other  words:  the  information  society  is  a  society  where  information  predominantly
circulates in the guise of data.
Accordingly,  our  first  question  must  be:  what  is  the  relationship  between  data  and
information? Etymologically, ‘data’ is what is given, that is, what appears to us and which
we therefore need to relate to. In the computer medium, what is given is given in digital
code, i.e. in the notorious series of ones and zeros that can be read as machine code. The
data  code,  the  configuration  of  ones  and  zeros,  is,  in  turn,  composed  to  capture  a
particular  referent:  the  code  denotes  a  property  of  the  referent,  and  it  does  so  by
identifying this property with a number, a metric measure, which is, again, the only thing
that can be read by the machine. To possess data is to have access to a reference to
something,  to  some object  whose  qualities  and  peculiarities  are  expressed  in  metric,
numerical  measures.  But  this  correspondence  between  the  referent  and  its  metric
representation is a fragile one. One thing is to have data, another to have good data. It
depends on the quality of the metrics used to generate data, the representational clout of
the data.
The procedure can be illustrated by Aristotle's famous definition of humans by way of
juxtaposing two metric distinctions: four-legged animals versus two-legged animals; and
animals with feathers versus animals without feathers. With these metrics, a human being
can hence be defined, impeccably, as a non-feathered biped. When working with metric
representations,  we  are  not,  in  other  words,  necessarily  dealing  with  very  rich
representations,  albeit  with  quite  accurate  ones.  We  can  only  gauge  qualities  that
correspond to  the  metrics  applied;  our  metric  systems are  grids  that  can reference a
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specified  set  of  qualities  of  the  object  to  be  encoded.  This  means  that  what  can  be
captured and represented as machine-readable data are standalone qualities, and often
also  discrete,  non-related,  qualities,  which  may  or  may  not  be  especially  prominent
qualities of that specific object. What can be coded as data is thus not necessarily the
particular,  individual  quality  of  the  object,  but  rather  — with  Gilles  Deleuze  and  Félix
Guattari's useful concept — the dividual aspects under which the object can be linked to
an appropriate set of metric determinations.
In this sense, data encoding provides a relatively limited view of the objects to which it
relates; it can only encode what can be recorded in a metric system, two legs or four legs,
feathers or not. Data are metric indications of qualities that may, or may not, be relevant to
the representation of the objects that they index. The representations they afford are not
necessarily  representative,  and the  dividual  characteristics  of  my person encoded into
various repositories are probably a far cry from being able to express my individuality. In
this  sense,  data  is  hardly  information  at  all,  or  a  possibly  quite  incomplete  form  of
information.  Such  data  only  becomes  Information  —  the  kind  of  information  that  is
produced by the information society, and which surveillance capitalism has turned into an
instrument of capital accumulation — once it has been organized in such a way that it
becomes representative.
Hence, if there is good reason to fear surveillance capitalism, it is not because, as the
saying goes, ‘it knows everything about me’; it is because it organizes my dividual data in
such a way that it determines what is to be taken to be representative of my individual self.
It  is  by  virtue  of  this  reversal  that  information  under  surveillance capitalism (or  in  the
information  society,  or  in  the  society  of  control,  there  are  many  names)  takes  on  a
fundamentally different form from the kind of information that was the subject of earlier
efforts of dissemination and the traditional object of information studies.
When data becomes information of this new kind, it is with the help of machines that can
aggregate and correlate the many and trivial dividual data that are being collected on an
unheard scale and with rigorous systematics. For example: let's assume the existence of a
handful  of  banal  and inconspicuous dividual  data  points  with  reference to  my person,
perhaps my ethnicity, my place of residence, my media habits, my travel patterns. These
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data points can then first be compared with similar data about other individuals, and then
correlated  among themselves,  and all  of  a  sudden,  I  may eventually  have become a
person of interest for the authorities. Or take a set of health data that together with family
data, consumption data and employment data can make me interesting (or not) for an
insurance company.  Or my credit  history,  my income, my real  estate  assets that  may
interest potential creditors. Or, of course, what I buy online, what I underline in the books I
read on my screen, what series I don't finish, which will be interesting to the producers of
such items.
Again: the individual data is not worth much. But they become valuable when aggregated
into large repositories of comparable and correlatable data and processed by shrewdly
concocted algorithms. It is not the particular, dividual slices of my behaviour that retain
interest,  but  those  together  with  the  many  others  with  which  they  are  imputed  to  be
comparable. Only then do possible co-variations emerge, which — when observed in very
large data sets — are an indication that there is also an actual connection between them,
whether or not it can be explained.
So how have ‘my’ data turned into valuable information? After my ‘I’ has been cut up into
metrically manageable dividual  slices, this data has been stacked with a host of other
people's data and then correlated vertically, among mine and others’ comparable dividual
slices,  and  horizontally,  between  different  stacked  slices.  What  suddenly  makes  me
interesting to the police, or the health authorities, or the bank, or the manufacturers, thus
really has very little to do with the individual ‘me’ that was the starting point. A peculiar
reversal  is  at  stake  here:  usually  we  assume that  information  is  a  reference  to  or  a
predication of a given object. But in the information society, this hierarchical relationship
between object and information is turned upside down. On the one hand, we have the data
that give only a very limited and ‘dividualised’ representation of the individual object, and
on the other hand the aggregated and correlated data that produce an entirely new object,
which  in  turn  might  in  fact  only  have  little  to  do  with  the  original  object,  but  which
nonetheless, by virtue of the information produced, makes it into an object of (a particular)
interest (legal, political, mercantile, etc.).
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The  information  in  question  is  thus  less  information  ‘about’  the  object,  but  rather  a
compound  metrical  material  from  which  a  new  object  is  constructed.  The  harvested,
tagged and distributed data is a matter that can be shaped, combined and mathematically
processed with intelligent algorithms, and thus become information about — brand new
objects!  Or  if  we  return  to  ‘my’ data:  first  they  are  harvested  through  dividualisation,
through a decoding of me as an individual, then they are processed through the big data
grinder, and finally they are re-encoded to become a virtual representation of me as a
potential  offender,  a  potential  patient,  a  potential  debtor,  a  potential  customer...  The
production of information projects and builds an arch that spans from the trivial data that is
not yet a representation of me, to a potential ‘person of interest’ that I might become. From
something that is not yet me to something that is no longer me.
‘Information’, as it is produced in the contemporary information society, is a very special
form of representation. It does not just refer to its object; it is created through a process
that first decodes the object and then re-encodes it in a new form. For a traditional critique
of representation, there is nothing particularly new in this; we know that a representation is
not  a  neutral  designation  of  something  non-present  (making  it  present  again  by  re-
presenting it),  but  an agency in  its  own right  that  shapes the represented object  in a
particular  way and thus also  produces a  particular  way of  relating  to  this  object.  Any
representation is part  of  what  Michel  Foucault  called ‘the representational  triangle’,  an
intimate, reciprocal relationship between an object, a representational image and a mode
of  relating  to  it.  A  critique  of  the  representational  mode  favoured  by  contemporary
information societies should perhaps pay less attention to the question of data privacy —
Big Brother is Watching You!’ and instead raise awareness of the manner in which the way
we produce information today constructs representations of us that will come to frame who
we can be and what we can do. The information society addresses us in accordance with
how it represents us: calling us into the image it has made of us. Emily Rosamond has put
it very well: "Surveillance capitalism (…) might be understood as a series of apparatuses
through  which  behaviour  is  actively  intervened  in,  by  being  continually  measured."
(Rosamond n.p.).
This  paradox  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  ‘information’  today  is  a  mode  of
representation that includes a temporal dimension. The algorithmic processing is based on
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past data. But past data can be used to construe an object that may be interesting in a
given future situation: this has been amply demonstrated by the financial algorithms for
future risk calculation that have been refined beyond imaginable sophistication for the last
three decades. The real information about me is not the trivial data of the past, but the
image of my future self, diligently confected and ready to meet me even before this future
has occurred. Information has basically become a  speculative phenomenon, a possible
future prospect of interest to someone who wants to sell a product, or someone who might
offer a diagnosis for a disease for which I have not yet developed symptoms. Indeed, the
production of information does not just put the picture of me ‘into’ time, the time I myself
believe I am living in. The new apparatus for production of information can construct time
in many different ways — it can work with many different pasts, many different individual
data points, and it can construct many different kinds of scenarios based on them. In this
way, it can model several different topological universes, none of which might have much
to do with my own experience of time. The arch from ‘not yet’ to ‘no longer’ can be flexed
and bent in as many ways as there are available data and relevant algorithms.
Here, we are at the core of the phenomenon of information in the developed information
society:  it  does  not  denote  an object  or  property  of  an  object,  but  a  temporality:  the
speculative relationship between the object's present future and its future present. And
hereby it invites me — and all the other objects it produces information about — to take
part in its play with time, or as Rosamond had it: it measures me and intervenes in my time
in one and the same gesture.
This  takes  us  back  to  the  media  historical  point  of  departure:  information  is  not  just
information  that  can  be  mediated  and  processed  in  different  ways.  Information  was
different for the Enlightenment encyclopédistes, the industrialists of the eighteenth century,
and the spies of the nineteenth century: each instantiation of information is produced in a
particular media system with particular contextual connections. A piece of information can
be a profane insight, an industrial secret, or a strategic lie. It can still be all this, but in the
present paradigm that has emerged with the information society, information is created
and produced in a new form: as a speculative investment in possible futures.
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If  one  abides  by  the  slightly  primitive  historical  schematic  above,  one  could  perhaps
tentatively  differentiate  between some different  forms that  information has assumed in
different contexts: for the  encyclopédistes it was the  dissertation; for the industrialists it
was the  formula, for the spies of the era of World Wars it was the  code. In the era of
surveillance capitalism, the basic form of information is the derivative.
The derivative has been one of the most important instruments in the financialization of the
economy — and of society at large — over the past decades. Basically, it is a contractual
formula that has been known for centuries, where, for example, it was possible to agree on
the price of a product to be delivered in the future, so that one can calculate with a fixed
price, independent of market fluctuations, which is good for the farmer who has sold the
crop in advance if the harvest is good and the price low, and bad if the harvest is scarce
and the prices high. In other words, the derivative is a security derived from the value of an
underlying asset. In modern finance, however, the derivative has been disassociated from
the actual delivery of the underlying commodity and has turned into a contract that can
formalize a bet on anything, allowing investors to either hedge against, or speculate on, all
kinds of market fluctuations. The volume of derivatives in contemporary finance by now
outweighs the volume of actual  securities,  and they form a dense and widely ramified
network that smooths and calibrates the value-to-price ratio in every conceivable market.
At the same time, derivatives are themselves a kind of securities that can be bought and
sold on the financial markets — and thus really a kind of money, which is not printed by a
national bank, but created every time two parties enter into a speculative contract. In this
sense, derivatives are, as Warren Buffet is often quoted for saying, financial weapons of
mass destruction. 
The boom in the use of derivatives, however, was not only due to the deregulations that
took place through the last quarter of the twentieth century, which was often justified by the
alleged ability of derivatives to price currencies against each other, needed after the US
abolished the gold standard in 1973, but also to the development of new techniques for
pricing  derivatives  themselves.  Based  on  experiences  with  statistically  based  credit
assessment and composition of investment portfolios, modern economics, in tandem with
the newly formed field informatics,  has developed models for the pricing of risk — no
longer  concrete  risks,  but  risk  as  such,  based  on  known  average  price  history,  on
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randomization of possible outcomes, and on statistical normal distribution theory. Myron
Scholes and Robert Merton were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1997 for the
formula for this relationship, which was easy to program into the machines that calculated
possible buying and selling prices for the traders.
Derivatives translate the contingency of the future into a risk that can be priced in the
present. Risk, Gerald Nestler remarks in an interview, is “a sort of a quasi-forensics of
future events, an enunciation of things as virtuals in the market form” (Nestler 132). Risk is
an  assumption  about  future  contingencies,  based  on  the  knowledge  of  the  past,  but
projected onto the future, and then subsequently retro-projected back onto the present by
virtue of pricing. This is the peculiar quality of derivatives: they construct potential futures
that can be traded, and thus acted on, in the present. The form of the derivative creates a
bridge from the present through the past to the future, and back to the present again. Or,
you could say: it does not face the future as an open horizon, but as a future that the
present already has its stakes in, and which is thus already expected — if not outright pre-
empted — in a particular way. This does not mean that the derivative has actually hedged
against the contingents of the future, but it does mean that it presupposes a particular
version of future in the present, thus necessarily narrowing down the horizon of what the
future might bring.
The success of the derivative, its key role in the financialization of modern economy, has
made it  a  dominant  symbolic  form of  our  age.  In  the  guise  of  a  contractually  based
assemblage of knowledge and assumptions, the derivative defines a particular temporal
order and the nature of the events involved in this order. In this sense, the derivative has
become a paradigm for the kind of pre-emptive prevision that comes with the information
regime of surveillance capitalism: a regime in which we constantly arrive a little too late in
the future, overtaken by information about ourselves that we still don’t even know about.
More  than  thirty  years  ago,  when  this  logic  was  still  in  its  infancy,  Gilles  Deleuze
formulated this definition of information, which in retrospect may seem almost prophetic:
What is information? It is not very complicated, everyone knows what it is. Information is a
set of imperatives, slogans, directions — order-words. When you are informed, you are
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told  what  you  are  supposed  to  believe.  (…)  And  outside  these  orders  and  their
transmission, there is no information, no communication. This is the same thing as saying
that information is exactly the system of control. (Deleuze 322).
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